August 15, 2007
By Joshua Kurlantzick
As a correspondent for The Economist in East Asia, based in
Thailand, one of my reporting assignments was covering the
first visit of a Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, to Cambodia
in November 2000. This was the first such visit in thirty
years--China and Cambodia have had a generally disastrous
modern history. (China was the major foreign patron of the
Khmer Rouge, and after the genocide in Cambodia there was
much lingering anger at all sorts of actors, including
China.)
Jiang received a strong public response in Cambodia, not
only from local officials whose job it is to do nice things
for visiting dignitaries, but from a huge number of
schoolchildren who came to welcome him, from the local
business community, and from thousands of local officials
from all over the country who came to greet him. The Chinese
government had done a great deal of preparatory work for
this visit. They had invested a lot of money in language
schools and cultural programs in Cambodia, built a kind of
Peace Corps program there, gave out scholarships for
children who would go on to study in China, and created a
huge aid program. China had done similar things in other
countries. But there was very little coverage of this in the
global media, which tended to focus on high-level diplomacy.
Accordingly, for the book project I went to China to speak
with Chinese officials about how they see their power in the
world emerging, particularly in developing parts of the
world--Asia, Africa, Latin America-and then went to a number
of countries in these regions to look at what China was
doing on the ground in these areas. I also wanted to find
out what if any results the Chinese had gotten from what we
call soft power.
HOW CHINA'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY EMERGES
There are many definitions of soft power, but basically,
when the Chinese government talks about its new soft power
in the world, it means all power outside of the military
sphere, including diplomacy, aid, investment, and economic
tools.
One reason for this new relationship with the world is that
China has experienced great domestic changes within the past
fifteen years. By the 1990s, you saw the growth of a more
confident, patriotic, even nationalistic public in China,
that, seeing how China had grown significantly, began to
talk about China's playing a larger role in the world, a
subject that was verboten fifteen years ago. The Chinese
leadership also has become much more engaged with the world,
with their own think tanks and universities to draw on to
develop a more sophisticated foreign policy. These leaders
have a more sophisticated view of the world, travel more,
and are able to play a larger, more confident global role.
Here in the U.S. we often talk of how difficult it is for
the government to change tack when something is perceived as
a mistake. This was not the case in China, which in the mid-
1990s was somewhat more adventurous militarily, launching
missiles into the Taiwan Strait and creating disputes in
Asia over islands that China and other countries have made
claims to. Beijing recognized that this adventurism was
really failing them and that they were alienating countries,
some of whom were coming back and restoring their relations
with the U.S.
Finally, there was the Asian financial crisis. The U.S. was
widely criticized for responding slowly to that crisis, and
you saw the beginning of the decline of America's image in
that part of the world. At the same time the Chinese
government was fairly proactive. They resisted devaluing
their currency and did a lot of good PR for this. Whatever
this may have contributed to solving the crisis, they really
hyped up that they were standing up for other countries in
Asia and got a lot of goodwill from this decision. It was
the first time they saw the benefits of promoting their
economic activity in the world as a benefit to other
nations.
CHINESE GOALS
China has new goals as it has become more engaged in the
world. First, it desperately needs access to resources. It
has a high level of industrial development, but is a vast
consumer of resources. If China was to develop at the same
pace as the U.S. and consume the same amount of resources,
it would be on a scale unprecedented in the world. As a
result, the Chinese government worries desperately where it
is going to get oil and gas. The government doesn't have the
kind of legitimacy that comes from elections; its legitimacy
comes from delivering economic growth. Every time that
growth declines or if there's an electricity blackout or the
like, the government worries. The Chinese also have been
overly dependent on too few oil and gas suppliers in the
world. They now look to places they can get oil and gas
where they won't be in direct competition with the U.S. or
Japan, places like Sudan and other countries where Western
nations either can't go because of sanctions or fear to go
because the environment is dangerous.
Also, as Chinese companies start to become internationally
active, they want to have places they can sell their goods.
Again, they often want to go to places where there's less
immediate competition with the U.S - places where the
environment is difficult for business.
As they get more influential, the Chinese want more partners
in international organizations such as the UN, the WTO, etc.
Isolating Taiwan has been a Chinese goal since the U.S. and
the rest of the world recognized China, and in the past few
years, as China has become more proactive and
internationally engaged, they have sought more to isolate
Taiwan, which has informal links with many other parts of
the world.
China's strategy since the late 1990s shows recognition that
in the U.S. its image will likely be mixed. Therefore, if it
could change its perception in other parts of the world and
reduce fears of its economic and military power in other
parts of the world, it could play a much greater role on the
global stage. This is actually quite sophisticated thinking.
Finally, the Chinese leadership to some degree desires in
the long run that China be the regional leader in Asia. It
feels that the U.S. is an unnatural actor in Asia, owing
from the legacy of WWII, when the U.S. was the only country
that had the power to play peacemaker role, to guarantee
stability in the region. In the long term, they feel, that
role would naturally be China's.
COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S STRATEGY
Since the late 1990s, China has shifted its foreign policy
away from just worrying about the U.S., as it had been doing
to a large extent since Kissinger and Zhou Enlai first met,
to a much broader focus. The time they spend in Africa,
Latin America, and other parts of the world is evidence that
Chinese leaders are putting a much higher priority on those
regions, recognizing that because China is also a developing
nation, it possibly can build relations with some of these
other parts of the world more effectively than the U.S. can.
China's leaders can suggest that their country stands on the
side of these other countries on issues like trade and
technology transfer. Whether or not this is actually true,
as a rhetorical device it's quite effective.
China sometimes focuses on countries where the U.S.
bilateral relationship is faltering. An extreme case is
Uzbekistan. About two years ago there was a significant
crackdown on opposition in that country in which hundreds of
people were brutally killed. The U.S. has had a closer
relationship with Uzbekistan since 9/11, since it wanted
bases there. We still have some bases there. But at the time
of the crackdown the relationship was downgraded.
Immediately after, the Chinese government invited the leader
of Uzbekistan for a state visit in Beijing.
You see this at a lower level, too. A good example is the
Philippines. The U.S. had long had a good relationship with
that country. But in July 2004 the Philippines took its
troops out of Iraq, probably in order to save a Filipino
hostage. The Bush administration criticized them, and
immediately after that the Chinese government announced an
enormous aid package for the Philippines and aggressively
stepped up its relationship. China recognizes that it can
benefit when the U.S. slips. It seeks to convey that unlike
the U.S., it does not interfere with other countries'
domestic affairs. It won't tell any country--Sudan, Myanmar,
or France--what to do. China has won some praise in some
countries for this.
China has also become more pragmatic. It does not want to
directly antagonize the U.S. or poke a finger in its eye; it
wants to still have a good relationship with the U.S. but
pursue these other strategies at the same time. For
instance, China has a very good relationship with Venezuela,
whose Hugo Chavez has made stridently anti-U.S. statements
in many forums, including the UN. When he did the same in
Beijing, China's ambassador to Venezuela immediately told
the local press that China did not want to associate itself
with those statements.
Finally, within political systems, China is far less
ideological than in the past. Forty years ago, China chose
its relations within political systems based on ideology.
There's very little of that any more. After rebels in Nepal
who took their philosophy directly from Chairman Mao began a
war against the king, China's government had to decide who
they were going to support. They decided to support the king
against the Maoist rebels.
CHINESE TOOLS OF INFLUENCE
With very little fanfare until this past year, China has
developed into a significant aid donor in the world. China
had given out aid in the 1950s and 1960s, in Mao's time, but
had retreated from this in recent years. Now, in some
countries like the Philippines and Cambodia and parts of
Africa, China has actually become a bigger donor than the
U.S. or Japan. The money is spent in a pretty sophisticated
way, not for building big sports stadiums, which is what
China was famous for in the past, but for their own version
of a Peace Corps. They spend money on local media and bring
politicians and officials from other countries to China to
trade. They do what we in America would call building
people-to-people contacts, which was hard for the Chinese
government to understand in the past.
This comes along with more skilled formal diplomacy. When I
was first based in Thailand, you never saw the Chinese
ambassador. He was invisible. China now has a new ambassador
to Thailand who often appears on that country's equivalent
of the Larry King Show. He speaks fluent Thai, and he's
perfectly willing to talk about China's relationship with
Thailand, a dramatic change from ten years ago. You see this
across the Chinese diplomatic corps. They're much more open,
much better in English and local languages, and more able to
interact with other countries.
This comes along with much increased promotion of cultural
and language studies. China has spent a lot of money
promoting language studies, funding the first and second
year of universities in 100-150 countries. Particularly in
poorer countries, they spend a lot of money promoting
Chinese studies in primary schools. If you do well there,
you can get a scholarship to go on to university in China.
Fifteen years ago there were very few foreign students in
China--a certain number of Americans who had come on
exchange programs, as well as some African students left
over from Mao's time. Now you have 110,000-140,000 overseas
students in China. (Some, of course, are students who
probably would have liked to study in the U.S. but visas
have become more difficult to obtain since 9/11.)
Particularly in Asia, China's TV and print media also have
become more accessible, and China has begun to invest in the
world. On trips abroad, Chinese officials are savvy at
suggesting the enormous potential of China's future
investment. Right now, China is a pretty small investor in
the world. But they talk about huge targets that China's
going to bring in the future--$100 billion in new investment
in Latin America, for example. It covers up that China is
still just feeling its way in the world as an investor.
Finally, China has become a country that embraces trade
agreements, which would shock U.S. trade officials of 15-20
years ago. China is now negotiating between 15-20 free trade
agreements all over the world at the same time.[1] If you
talk to people in the U.S. who negotiate FTAs, they'd say
that's impossible, it takes a year to negotiate just one
FTA. What the Chinese government does is negotiate an FTA
that has very little substance in it, sign it, then work out
the substance later. Which brings a lot of good will.
Obviously in the U.S. context, one could not say to
businesses or Congress, "We're just going to sign a trade
agreement, we'll tell you what's in it later."
MATRICES OF CHINESE SUCCESS
In a lot of parts of the world where there had been fear of
China's economic growth, particularly in the developing
world, you see much less fear today. This is reflected in
the media coverage -- even, for instance, in the coverage of
exports of tainted goods from China. The Southeast Asia
media gives this much less coverage than the U.S. media
does. This reflects their much higher degree of comfort with
China as an economic partner. If you look at both global and
local public opinion polls, China is viewed more favorably
in a lot of countries as an actor on the global stage than
the U.S. Chinese businesspeople and officials also are now
getting access to a lot of countries that once they never
would have.
Another sign of China's success is that there's a lot of
interest in China's model of development. Countries from
Syria to Iran, from Vietnam to South Africa feel that China
somehow has done something different from Western countries
given its staggering growth rate. China probably doesn't
have a substantially different model of development, but the
fact that it has developed to be so strong economically
without loosening political control is an attractive idea to
a leader of an authoritarian country. Vietnamese officials
with whom I spoke for my book really want to copy what China
has done.
In Asia, local ethnic Chinese historically were viewed as a
prism for how to view relations with China. You see this in
diaspora communities in many parts of the world. Ten years
ago, when I first moved to Southeast Asia, Indonesians were
burning down the homes of ethnic Chinese, looting their
shops. Now you have an overwhelming celebration of Chinese
culture. Indonesia's president talks about it, and local
ethnic Chinese there run for parliament.
China, in fact, has increased its allure to the point that
it now plays a quite interesting role for other poor nations
on its border. In some ways China is now viewed by some of
these nations the way the U.S. might be viewed in Central
America, or the EU in Moldova. China is a place you want to
get to in order to live a better life. China is still a very
poor country, but some of the poorer border countries view
China as extremely wealthy. People in Myanmar, northern
Thailand, and Laos want to marry visiting Chinese
businesspeople, thinking it would get them into China.
That's actually not true, but it shows the dramatic change
in China's image.
As China has increased its access to resources, it's been
able to diversify its suppliers of oil and gas, so that its
oil and gas take from Africa has nearly doubled over the
past ten years.
Finally, China now has more peacekeepers serving under the
UN flag than any member of the Permanent 5 on the Security
Council except France. They serve in Africa, the Caribbean,
with very little comment or concern, which reflects some
degree of comfort with China's presence in these places.
WHY SOFT POWER MATTERS
China's growing popularity broadens its public appeal and
allows other countries to cooperate more closely with it,
including on defense cooperation. One Filipino defense
official put it to me this way: "Ten years ago in the
Philippines, which is a vibrant democracy, with a very free
press, if the Chinese had come to us and offered us closer
defense training or an alliance, it would have been
unthinkable, because it would have gotten out to the public
and criticized. Now we know it's essentially acceptable to
the public, because China's image has improved quite well,
and so the Philippines has pushed forward with closer
defense and economic cooperation with China."
So public appeal does matter. Conversely, here in the U.S.
we often thought it didn't matter that much, but when it
comes to the run-up to the war in Iraq, when you would like
cooperation with Turkey, our long-time friend, but Turkey's
a democracy now, and the government of Turkey knows that
U.S. public appeal is not so strong in Turkey, and we're
unable to get their support for an incursion from Turkey
into northern Iraq. Rumsfeld himself said that was one of
the major factors that hindered the war effort at first.
You see the same thing with economic cooperation--countries
in Africa, Asia, other parts of the world becoming more
comfortable in their relationship with China, partly because
it's easier for them to tolerate China's public appeal. The
U.S. still has a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia,
but the Saudi government must necessarily be worried about
the public appeal of having a relationship with the U.S.
It's not surprising that the Saudi government has formed
close links to China and thought about building China its
own strategic petroleum reserve.
As China has become more influential, opinion leaders from
all over the world are visiting or studying there. One of
the things the U.S. has always drawn upon is the generations
of opinion leaders who had come to the U.S. for education,
gone home and been the best ambassadors for the U.S.--
Margaret Thatcher, Hamid Karzai, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo in the Philippines. China is increasingly going to
play that role, and that will necessarily impact how other
country leaders think of it.
Finally, as China becomes more acceptable economically, it's
going to be able to drive Asia as a more integrating trading
region. There will be less fear of it and China can drive
trade.
QUESTIONS
In the short term, China has wielded a significant amount of
power. But in the long term it faces very substantial
questions, as long as it remains the kind of country it is.
First, is China really a model for other countries like
Vietnam, Syria, Iran, South Africa? Yes, it's developed and
has remained an authoritarian state. But do they really have
any different model of development?
Second, as China becomes a greater actor in the world, can
it provide the kind of positive goods that the U.S. has
provided for years--such as security and response to
disasters? After the December 2004 tsunami hit Asia, though
the U.S. was very unpopular in a number of the affected
countries, those countries had to rely on the U.S. because
no one else was able to provide that type of disaster
relief. (Actually, the U.S. response to the tsunami did
improve its public image among those countries.)
Third and most important, China has gone far with its idea
that it, unlike the U.S., doesn't interfere in other
countries' affairs. However, the domestic affairs in a lot
of the countries with which China has relations are crying
out for some kind of resolution. China has said it won't
interfere in Sudan, but many in Sudan would like some sort
of interference, because right now the situation is
untenable. The government in Myanmar has a close
relationship with China. Many people, activists of a
movement that was elected 15, 17 years ago, would like China
to push the government to recognize them. Noninterference
isn't a policy that can exist in the world over the long
term. China has begun to think about this. They've sent
their own envoy to Sudan, they've thought about changing
their relationship with Myanmar. They're realizing that if
you're going to be a real global power, you can't
necessarily stick with this philosophy. But if they're going
to diverge from this philosophy, are they then just going to
be like the U.S.? Or can they be somehow something different
at the same time?
Joshua Kurlantzick is special correspondent for the New
Republic and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. He has covered Southeast Asia and
China as a correspondent for US News and World Report and
The Economist, and his writings on Asia have appeared in
Foreign Affairs, the New York Times Magazine, and many other
publications. This essay is based on the BookTalk he gave at
FPRI on July 25, at which copies of his new book, Charm
Offensive (Yale University Press), were sold by Joseph Fox
Bookshop, 1724 Sansom St., Philadelphia
(www.foxbookshop.com), where the book is also available.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] See report on FPRI's Oct. 4, 2006 "China and Free Trade"
conference at http://www.fpri.org/research/asia/.
Friday, August 17, 2007
UNITED STATES–EAST TIMOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 2007
UNITED STATES–EAST TIMOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 2007
ANNOUNCEMENT
The East-West Center is pleased to announce the 2007 United States–East Timor Scholarship Program competition. The Program, funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, is a competitive, merit-based scholarship program open to East Timorese who meet specific selection criteria.
The objective of the Program is to identify and support the education of academically talented East Timorese who are in the future expected to assume leadership roles in East Timor. Following a “bridge” year of intensive English language preparation, the scholarship normally provides the opportunity to pursue the bachelor’s (S1) degree study at a university in the United States, in fields that are directly relevant to the needs of East Timor. It will also enable the recipients to obtain a broader understanding of the United States. The scholarship program will include a summer internship in Washington, D.C. as well as a four to five week community service project in East Timor.
Eligible fields of study emphasize areas of critical development needs in East Timor. Students admitted to the undergraduate degree program will pursue fields of study related to agricultural or environmental studies, business, communications or journalism, economics, education, international relations, natural resources management, political science, psychology, and urban planning.
Completed applications must be received by 27 AUGUST 2007 for awards beginning in January 2008.
For 2007, five (5) scholarships will be available.
There are specific eligibility and selection criteria that applicants must satisfy before they can be considered for a scholarship. Please see “Information for Applicants” in the application packet for complete details regarding eligibility and selection criteria.
Applications
In East Timor, an application packet may be obtained from the United States Embassy, Praia dos Coqueiros, Dili. For more information in East Timor, please contact the East-West Center’s representative in Dili, Ms. Emma Coupland. Mobile: (+670) 735 8477 (within East Timor), or e-mail: uset_ships@yahoo.com Application materials may also be obtained from the Award Services Office at the East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawai`i 96848-1601, USA.
All application documents contained in the application packet may also be found at the following Internet site: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/studentprograms
Telephone, fax, or e-mail inquiries to the East-West Center should be routed as follows: telephone: 1-808-944-7735; fax: 1-808-944-7730; or e-mail: uset@eastwestcenter.org. Faxed inquiries should include in large print the individual’s name, mailing address, telephone, and, if available, fax number and e-mail address. All inquiries should reference the 2006 United States–East Timor Scholarship Program.
ANNOUNCEMENT
The East-West Center is pleased to announce the 2007 United States–East Timor Scholarship Program competition. The Program, funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, is a competitive, merit-based scholarship program open to East Timorese who meet specific selection criteria.
The objective of the Program is to identify and support the education of academically talented East Timorese who are in the future expected to assume leadership roles in East Timor. Following a “bridge” year of intensive English language preparation, the scholarship normally provides the opportunity to pursue the bachelor’s (S1) degree study at a university in the United States, in fields that are directly relevant to the needs of East Timor. It will also enable the recipients to obtain a broader understanding of the United States. The scholarship program will include a summer internship in Washington, D.C. as well as a four to five week community service project in East Timor.
Eligible fields of study emphasize areas of critical development needs in East Timor. Students admitted to the undergraduate degree program will pursue fields of study related to agricultural or environmental studies, business, communications or journalism, economics, education, international relations, natural resources management, political science, psychology, and urban planning.
Completed applications must be received by 27 AUGUST 2007 for awards beginning in January 2008.
For 2007, five (5) scholarships will be available.
There are specific eligibility and selection criteria that applicants must satisfy before they can be considered for a scholarship. Please see “Information for Applicants” in the application packet for complete details regarding eligibility and selection criteria.
Applications
In East Timor, an application packet may be obtained from the United States Embassy, Praia dos Coqueiros, Dili. For more information in East Timor, please contact the East-West Center’s representative in Dili, Ms. Emma Coupland. Mobile: (+670) 735 8477 (within East Timor), or e-mail: uset_ships@yahoo.com Application materials may also be obtained from the Award Services Office at the East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawai`i 96848-1601, USA.
All application documents contained in the application packet may also be found at the following Internet site: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/studentprograms
Telephone, fax, or e-mail inquiries to the East-West Center should be routed as follows: telephone: 1-808-944-7735; fax: 1-808-944-7730; or e-mail: uset@eastwestcenter.org. Faxed inquiries should include in large print the individual’s name, mailing address, telephone, and, if available, fax number and e-mail address. All inquiries should reference the 2006 United States–East Timor Scholarship Program.
Thursday, August 16, 2007
Charity Says U.S. Food Aid Hurts Poor
Charity Says U.S. Food Aid Hurts Poor
Aug 16 07:48 PM US/Eastern
By KATHARINE HOURELD
Associated Press Writer
NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) - A humanitarian group has turned down $46 million worth of U.S. food aid, arguing that the way the American government distributes its help hurts poor farmers.
CARE said wheat donated by the U.S. government and sold by charities to finance anti-poverty programs results in low-priced crops being dumped on local markets and small-scale growers cannot compete.
Other experts said they share CARE's concern, but stressed that food donations are sometimes needed when a natural disaster harms a local area's agriculture, such as the flooding that North Korea says has devastated vast tracts of its farmland.
The Atlanta-based CARE agreed with that view. "We are not against emergency food aid for things like drought and famine," spokeswoman Alina Labrada said Thursday.
But, she added, the donation of wheat and other crops does not help in regions where people consistently go hungry because local farming has been weakened by international competition. "They are being hurt instead of helped by this mechanism," she said.
Labrada said such areas would be helped more if the U.S. and other donors gave cash that could be spent on locally produced crops, which would stimulate agricultural expansion.
The United States Agency for International Development said Thursday that its experts carry out detailed assessments to try to ensure that commodities do not disrupt local production. Jim Kunder, USAID's acting deputy adminstrator, said $375 million is the approximate average cash value of commodities that are donated for sale.
CARE decided in 2005 to phase out accepting grain donations within four years, but the move is gaining new attention because of the current debate in the U.S. Congress over the Farm Bill, which is reauthorized every five years.
"This is a crucial time. It will set policy for the next five years," Labrada said.
The U.S. farm sector and the maritime industry are the biggest supporters of the current system. The program soaks up surplus farm production, and shippers get lucrative contracts to transport donated grain for sale in needy regions.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a study in April saying that emergency American food aid takes an average of 4.5 months to arrive and that legal requirements mean two-thirds of the money spent by the government on food aid goes for packing and shipping.
Washington spends an average of $2 billion on food aid programs a year, mostly funneling the help through the United Nations' World Food Program. According to some aid groups, if the U.S. gave its aid in cash rather than food, it could support about twice as many people.
In the last two farm bills, the U.S. administration called for a partial shift to cash donations instead of grain, but that was voted down by farm supporters.
According to the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, the U.S. administration's proposals for future farm spending call for 25 percent of the food aid budget to be in cash.
The European Union has spoken out strongly against U.S. food aid policy in the Word Trade Organization, accusing Washington of using such programs to skirt rules limiting agriculture subsidies.
Christian Rasmussen, at the EU's agriculture directorate in Brussels, Belgium, said the bloc had replaced food aid with cash to ensure help gets to poor countries more quickly.
"It ensures a correct diet, because you also try to buy the proper products. It's also very cost effective because you can buy the food close to the market, unlike in the U.S. case," he said.
Like aid groups, African farmers are divided.
Ousmane Ndiaye, director of the farmer and rural worker group in the West African nation of Senegal, said dumping cheap crops undermines local agriculture.
"We have the resources that we need to nourish our population. We have land. We have men and women with the capacity to do it," he said. "We have millet here. But instead of buying the millet that comes from the middle of Senegal, some people prefer to buy sorghum from foreign countries."
In neighboring Mali, however, the secretary-general of the farmers association said foreign aid helps Malians get crops that aren't produced locally.
"We farm wheat in the north of Mali, around Timbuktu. But that's not enough for all the flour we need for bread," said Fousseyni Traore. He said Mali could never produce enough wheat because its southern areas are too wet and tropical.
The Minnesota-based Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy said that in 2001, the sale of donated American grain provided 30 percent of U.S. aid groups' gross revenues, totaling $1.5 billion.
Tom Getman, executive director for international relations at the aid group World Vision, said he shared CARE's concern about the system but didn't want to turn away any kind of aid.
World Vision also is pushing to get more cash donations and less food, "because we've all gotten more and more anxious about how much it costs to do the shipping and the mixed results on the ground," Getman said.
"But there is going to be a continuing need, like in (North) Korea right now, where we've got to have food available for emergency situations. So it's just finding the balance that is so tough."
___
Associated Press writers Alexander Higgins and Frank Jordans in Geneva and Heidi Vogt in Dakar, Senegal, contributed to this report.
Copyright 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
Aug 16 07:48 PM US/Eastern
By KATHARINE HOURELD
Associated Press Writer
NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) - A humanitarian group has turned down $46 million worth of U.S. food aid, arguing that the way the American government distributes its help hurts poor farmers.
CARE said wheat donated by the U.S. government and sold by charities to finance anti-poverty programs results in low-priced crops being dumped on local markets and small-scale growers cannot compete.
Other experts said they share CARE's concern, but stressed that food donations are sometimes needed when a natural disaster harms a local area's agriculture, such as the flooding that North Korea says has devastated vast tracts of its farmland.
The Atlanta-based CARE agreed with that view. "We are not against emergency food aid for things like drought and famine," spokeswoman Alina Labrada said Thursday.
But, she added, the donation of wheat and other crops does not help in regions where people consistently go hungry because local farming has been weakened by international competition. "They are being hurt instead of helped by this mechanism," she said.
Labrada said such areas would be helped more if the U.S. and other donors gave cash that could be spent on locally produced crops, which would stimulate agricultural expansion.
The United States Agency for International Development said Thursday that its experts carry out detailed assessments to try to ensure that commodities do not disrupt local production. Jim Kunder, USAID's acting deputy adminstrator, said $375 million is the approximate average cash value of commodities that are donated for sale.
CARE decided in 2005 to phase out accepting grain donations within four years, but the move is gaining new attention because of the current debate in the U.S. Congress over the Farm Bill, which is reauthorized every five years.
"This is a crucial time. It will set policy for the next five years," Labrada said.
The U.S. farm sector and the maritime industry are the biggest supporters of the current system. The program soaks up surplus farm production, and shippers get lucrative contracts to transport donated grain for sale in needy regions.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a study in April saying that emergency American food aid takes an average of 4.5 months to arrive and that legal requirements mean two-thirds of the money spent by the government on food aid goes for packing and shipping.
Washington spends an average of $2 billion on food aid programs a year, mostly funneling the help through the United Nations' World Food Program. According to some aid groups, if the U.S. gave its aid in cash rather than food, it could support about twice as many people.
In the last two farm bills, the U.S. administration called for a partial shift to cash donations instead of grain, but that was voted down by farm supporters.
According to the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, the U.S. administration's proposals for future farm spending call for 25 percent of the food aid budget to be in cash.
The European Union has spoken out strongly against U.S. food aid policy in the Word Trade Organization, accusing Washington of using such programs to skirt rules limiting agriculture subsidies.
Christian Rasmussen, at the EU's agriculture directorate in Brussels, Belgium, said the bloc had replaced food aid with cash to ensure help gets to poor countries more quickly.
"It ensures a correct diet, because you also try to buy the proper products. It's also very cost effective because you can buy the food close to the market, unlike in the U.S. case," he said.
Like aid groups, African farmers are divided.
Ousmane Ndiaye, director of the farmer and rural worker group in the West African nation of Senegal, said dumping cheap crops undermines local agriculture.
"We have the resources that we need to nourish our population. We have land. We have men and women with the capacity to do it," he said. "We have millet here. But instead of buying the millet that comes from the middle of Senegal, some people prefer to buy sorghum from foreign countries."
In neighboring Mali, however, the secretary-general of the farmers association said foreign aid helps Malians get crops that aren't produced locally.
"We farm wheat in the north of Mali, around Timbuktu. But that's not enough for all the flour we need for bread," said Fousseyni Traore. He said Mali could never produce enough wheat because its southern areas are too wet and tropical.
The Minnesota-based Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy said that in 2001, the sale of donated American grain provided 30 percent of U.S. aid groups' gross revenues, totaling $1.5 billion.
Tom Getman, executive director for international relations at the aid group World Vision, said he shared CARE's concern about the system but didn't want to turn away any kind of aid.
World Vision also is pushing to get more cash donations and less food, "because we've all gotten more and more anxious about how much it costs to do the shipping and the mixed results on the ground," Getman said.
"But there is going to be a continuing need, like in (North) Korea right now, where we've got to have food available for emergency situations. So it's just finding the balance that is so tough."
___
Associated Press writers Alexander Higgins and Frank Jordans in Geneva and Heidi Vogt in Dakar, Senegal, contributed to this report.
Copyright 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
Videocon Creates Subsidiary for Timor-Leste PSC
Videocon Creates Subsidiary for Timor-Leste PSC
Videocan Industries 8/14/2007
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=48969
Videocan Industries has incorporated an SPV, Global Energy Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, to explore for, develop and exploit Petroleum Block JPDA 06-103 and the export and marketing of that Petroleum and all activities. As such, Global Energy Inc. is part of the consortium which was awarded the JPDA 06-103 Production Sharing Contract by the Timor Sea Designated Authority.
The Participating Interest of Global Energy Inc., in the JPDA 06-103 Production Sharing Contract is 25%.
The Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) is within the Bonaparte Basin with estimated 23 Tcf (known reserves in Bonaparte Basin stated by the Australian Government during its 2004 Bid Round) of undiscovered EUR Gas Reserves. Besides Gas, there could be substantial Condensate recovery.
There is a gas field in the JPDA, namely Bayu-Undan, with 3.4 Tcf of gas reserves and 400 million barrels of condensate and LPG reserves, which exports dry gas via a 26" pipeline from Bayu-Undan to Darwin in North Western Australia where the dry gas is converted to LNG for export and sales. The condensate and LPG arc stripped from the gas at offshore facilities in the field and exported for sale by tanker.
In Production Sharing Contract 06-103, Leads 103-A and 103-C have been identified with recoverable unrisked potential of 260 million barrels of Oil or 1300 BCF gas and 130 million barrels of Oil or 571 BCF gas respectively.
In JPDA 06-103 a contract for 1657 sq kms of 3-D data acquisition has been awarded at an estimated cost of $18.6 million. 1055 sq kms of reprocessed 3-D data to the north of the block has already been acquired from Fugro. With this it would facilitate zeroing in on the 4 well locations for the commitment wells included in the Minimum Work Program.
Drilling is anticipated to start in 2008. The Company's share in the current Work Program is US $18.9 million.
Partners in JPDA Block 06-13 are Oilex as operator; Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation and Bharat Petroleum.
Videocan Industries 8/14/2007
URL: http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=48969
Videocan Industries has incorporated an SPV, Global Energy Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, to explore for, develop and exploit Petroleum Block JPDA 06-103 and the export and marketing of that Petroleum and all activities. As such, Global Energy Inc. is part of the consortium which was awarded the JPDA 06-103 Production Sharing Contract by the Timor Sea Designated Authority.
The Participating Interest of Global Energy Inc., in the JPDA 06-103 Production Sharing Contract is 25%.
The Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) is within the Bonaparte Basin with estimated 23 Tcf (known reserves in Bonaparte Basin stated by the Australian Government during its 2004 Bid Round) of undiscovered EUR Gas Reserves. Besides Gas, there could be substantial Condensate recovery.
There is a gas field in the JPDA, namely Bayu-Undan, with 3.4 Tcf of gas reserves and 400 million barrels of condensate and LPG reserves, which exports dry gas via a 26" pipeline from Bayu-Undan to Darwin in North Western Australia where the dry gas is converted to LNG for export and sales. The condensate and LPG arc stripped from the gas at offshore facilities in the field and exported for sale by tanker.
In Production Sharing Contract 06-103, Leads 103-A and 103-C have been identified with recoverable unrisked potential of 260 million barrels of Oil or 1300 BCF gas and 130 million barrels of Oil or 571 BCF gas respectively.
In JPDA 06-103 a contract for 1657 sq kms of 3-D data acquisition has been awarded at an estimated cost of $18.6 million. 1055 sq kms of reprocessed 3-D data to the north of the block has already been acquired from Fugro. With this it would facilitate zeroing in on the 4 well locations for the commitment wells included in the Minimum Work Program.
Drilling is anticipated to start in 2008. The Company's share in the current Work Program is US $18.9 million.
Partners in JPDA Block 06-13 are Oilex as operator; Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation and Bharat Petroleum.
Aid arrives in East Timor districts
Aid arrives in East Timor districts
August 14, 2007 - 8:24PM
Emergency aid was delivered by air and land to thousands of refugees who fled homes in East Timor due to violence triggered by the appointment of a new government, officials say.
Hundreds of homes, schools and offices were torched in the eastern districts of Viqueque and Baucau after Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao was named prime minister on August 6, angering members of the former ruling party.
Efforts to reach about 4,000 people displaced by the unrest - some sheltering in churches, police stations and surrounding mountains - were restricted after armed assailants ambushed a UN convoy late last week.
Two UN helicopters delivered basic need supplies like rice, noodles, milk and tents to the area Tuesday, Vice Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres told reporters in the capital, Dili.
A 15-vehicle government convoy, guarded by 30 soldiers from the national Timorese army, was also bringing in supplies, said a statement from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
East Timor, which became independent with UN backing in 2002, has struggled to restore stability since communal clashes last year killed 37 and drove 155,000 from their homes.
The economy is in tatters, tens of thousands live in tent camps and around a fifth of the population faced food shortages before the recent unrest.
The UN said the situation in East Timor was tense, although no major security incidents were reported. Six UN vehicles were attacked with stones Monday night, leaving a UN police officer hurt.
© 2007 AP DIGITAL
August 14, 2007 - 8:24PM
Emergency aid was delivered by air and land to thousands of refugees who fled homes in East Timor due to violence triggered by the appointment of a new government, officials say.
Hundreds of homes, schools and offices were torched in the eastern districts of Viqueque and Baucau after Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao was named prime minister on August 6, angering members of the former ruling party.
Efforts to reach about 4,000 people displaced by the unrest - some sheltering in churches, police stations and surrounding mountains - were restricted after armed assailants ambushed a UN convoy late last week.
Two UN helicopters delivered basic need supplies like rice, noodles, milk and tents to the area Tuesday, Vice Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres told reporters in the capital, Dili.
A 15-vehicle government convoy, guarded by 30 soldiers from the national Timorese army, was also bringing in supplies, said a statement from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
East Timor, which became independent with UN backing in 2002, has struggled to restore stability since communal clashes last year killed 37 and drove 155,000 from their homes.
The economy is in tatters, tens of thousands live in tent camps and around a fifth of the population faced food shortages before the recent unrest.
The UN said the situation in East Timor was tense, although no major security incidents were reported. Six UN vehicles were attacked with stones Monday night, leaving a UN police officer hurt.
© 2007 AP DIGITAL
East Timor, fragile test-bed for intervention
East Timor, fragile test-bed for intervention
Simon Tisdall
Tuesday August 14, 2007
The Guardian
Gang violence, rape and arson attacks following the appointment of a new government in East Timor have underscored the country's continuing fragility eight years after the international community, improvising on a theme developed by Tony Blair, intervened to end Indonesian control.
As with other noted "humanitarian interventions" in Kosovo and Sierra Leone during the same period, Timor is seriously unfinished business - but no longer enjoys the political attention that briefly made it an international cause celebre. As a result, the nation-building agenda laid out after formal independence in 2002 remains as daunting as ever - and may yet fail.
Internal factors are just as important. Timorese society is deeply divided, not least between the east, heartland of the pre-independence Fretilin movement's resistance to Indonesian rule, and western areas. Despite considerable potential oil and gas revenue, secured by a 2006 deal with Australia, most Timorese people remain desperately poor, with up to 80% unemployed.
Language is another barrier: Tetum, the dominant local language, vies with Indonesian and Portuguese, now designated, oddly, as Timor's official tongue.
The wounds of last year's army mutiny and the subsequent violence and political showdown have yet to heal. According to the UN, 15% of the roughly 1 million population was uprooted at the time and many remain so. This crisis formed the bitter backdrop to elections in June.
Fretilin emerged with the most seats but forfeited power to a coalition led by former Falintil guerrilla leader, Xanana Gusmao. Mr Gusmao, East Timor's first president, was named prime minister last week by his sometime ally, current president José Ramos Horta.
At his swearing-in ceremony, Mr Gusmao vowed to bridge the country's divisions: "No political party, no institutional entity, no citizen will be excluded from the political process... The new government's first priority is to regain the confidence of the institutions of state." But Fretilin's leader, former prime minister Mari Alkatiri, declared the new government illegal and announced a parliamentary boycott.
Although Mr Alkatiri condemned election-related violence, including attacks on UN personnel and Australian peacekeepers, the UN pinned the blame on Fretilin supporters. So far Fretilin has ignored appeals by NGOs and election observers to rejoin the political process.
While Timor's troubles no longer directly concern Mr Blair and others who viewed their solution as integral to a new international order, they remain a cause for concern in Canberra, the leading bilateral aid donor. Australia also has about 1,000 troops in the country, part of the International Stabilisation Force supporting the UN mission, and there is little prospect of an early departure.
Greg Sheridan, foreign editor of the newspaper The Australian, accused Fretilin of responsibility for the upheavals in a recent commentary: "Its leaders say they are not ordering or even sanctioning violence. But these were Fretilin mobs that were rioting and Fretilin's leaders could have stopped the riots ... Fretilin is facing a Hamas-like moment. It must decide whether it is essentially an armed militia or a respectable political party."
The insecurity was undermining attempts to attract foreign investment or develop job-creating industries such as tourism, Mr Sheridan added. Australia would have to stay engaged there for many years to come - or risk witnessing a civil war.
There are other ways of looking at external involvement. East Timor's chronic dependence on military support, on an estimated $3bn in foreign aid in recent years, and on a series of UN missions (the fifth since 1999, Unmit, came last year) was a hot election issue, with many voters wondering what their hard-won sovereignty really means.
According to Loro Horta, writing at openDemocracy.net, such worries point to a more fundamental dilemma: what he called "the loss of trust by the people in its once near-mythical leaders".
Just as Fretilin was increasingly seen not as a national movement but as a party dominated by easterners, he argued that "Xanana Gusmao himself - the once revered guerrilla leader and father of the nation, looked upon as a pillar of national unity and impartiality - has also suffered a significant demystification.
"Horta and Gusmao face the consequences of having made various deals and concessions in order to secure support ... They may remain the nation's most respected politicians. But some of their prestige has been severely dented."
In short, the liberation's leaders are struggling to secure their achievement - while former international cheerleaders turn their backs and Indonesia, a giant neighbour with a long memory, watches quietly from across the 1999 border.
If they fail, it is unclear who or what will follow.
Simon Tisdall
Tuesday August 14, 2007
The Guardian
Gang violence, rape and arson attacks following the appointment of a new government in East Timor have underscored the country's continuing fragility eight years after the international community, improvising on a theme developed by Tony Blair, intervened to end Indonesian control.
As with other noted "humanitarian interventions" in Kosovo and Sierra Leone during the same period, Timor is seriously unfinished business - but no longer enjoys the political attention that briefly made it an international cause celebre. As a result, the nation-building agenda laid out after formal independence in 2002 remains as daunting as ever - and may yet fail.
Internal factors are just as important. Timorese society is deeply divided, not least between the east, heartland of the pre-independence Fretilin movement's resistance to Indonesian rule, and western areas. Despite considerable potential oil and gas revenue, secured by a 2006 deal with Australia, most Timorese people remain desperately poor, with up to 80% unemployed.
Language is another barrier: Tetum, the dominant local language, vies with Indonesian and Portuguese, now designated, oddly, as Timor's official tongue.
The wounds of last year's army mutiny and the subsequent violence and political showdown have yet to heal. According to the UN, 15% of the roughly 1 million population was uprooted at the time and many remain so. This crisis formed the bitter backdrop to elections in June.
Fretilin emerged with the most seats but forfeited power to a coalition led by former Falintil guerrilla leader, Xanana Gusmao. Mr Gusmao, East Timor's first president, was named prime minister last week by his sometime ally, current president José Ramos Horta.
At his swearing-in ceremony, Mr Gusmao vowed to bridge the country's divisions: "No political party, no institutional entity, no citizen will be excluded from the political process... The new government's first priority is to regain the confidence of the institutions of state." But Fretilin's leader, former prime minister Mari Alkatiri, declared the new government illegal and announced a parliamentary boycott.
Although Mr Alkatiri condemned election-related violence, including attacks on UN personnel and Australian peacekeepers, the UN pinned the blame on Fretilin supporters. So far Fretilin has ignored appeals by NGOs and election observers to rejoin the political process.
While Timor's troubles no longer directly concern Mr Blair and others who viewed their solution as integral to a new international order, they remain a cause for concern in Canberra, the leading bilateral aid donor. Australia also has about 1,000 troops in the country, part of the International Stabilisation Force supporting the UN mission, and there is little prospect of an early departure.
Greg Sheridan, foreign editor of the newspaper The Australian, accused Fretilin of responsibility for the upheavals in a recent commentary: "Its leaders say they are not ordering or even sanctioning violence. But these were Fretilin mobs that were rioting and Fretilin's leaders could have stopped the riots ... Fretilin is facing a Hamas-like moment. It must decide whether it is essentially an armed militia or a respectable political party."
The insecurity was undermining attempts to attract foreign investment or develop job-creating industries such as tourism, Mr Sheridan added. Australia would have to stay engaged there for many years to come - or risk witnessing a civil war.
There are other ways of looking at external involvement. East Timor's chronic dependence on military support, on an estimated $3bn in foreign aid in recent years, and on a series of UN missions (the fifth since 1999, Unmit, came last year) was a hot election issue, with many voters wondering what their hard-won sovereignty really means.
According to Loro Horta, writing at openDemocracy.net, such worries point to a more fundamental dilemma: what he called "the loss of trust by the people in its once near-mythical leaders".
Just as Fretilin was increasingly seen not as a national movement but as a party dominated by easterners, he argued that "Xanana Gusmao himself - the once revered guerrilla leader and father of the nation, looked upon as a pillar of national unity and impartiality - has also suffered a significant demystification.
"Horta and Gusmao face the consequences of having made various deals and concessions in order to secure support ... They may remain the nation's most respected politicians. But some of their prestige has been severely dented."
In short, the liberation's leaders are struggling to secure their achievement - while former international cheerleaders turn their backs and Indonesia, a giant neighbour with a long memory, watches quietly from across the 1999 border.
If they fail, it is unclear who or what will follow.
GSPC plans to start drilling in Timor sea block next yr
NEWS
GSPC plans to start drilling in Timor sea block next yr
Press Trust Of India
Mumbai, August 14: State-run Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation (GSPC) and Videocon Industries on Tuesday said drilling in a Timor Sea exploration block, where they hold 25 per cent stake each, will begin next year.
Videocon's share of exploratory expenditure would be $18.9 million, a company press release said.
Besides Videocon, GSPC, Bharat Petroleum and Oilex of Australia also have 25 per cent stake each in Block 103 in Joint Petroleum Development Area located in the Timor Sea between Australia and Timor-Leste.
PDA is within the Bonaparte Basin that is estimated to hold 23 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Videocon said a contract for 1,657 sq km of 3-D data acquisition has been awarded at an estimated cost of $18.6 million. About 1,055 sq km of reprocessed 3-D data to the north of the block has already been acquired, it added.
GSPC plans to start drilling in Timor sea block next yr
Press Trust Of India
Mumbai, August 14: State-run Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation (GSPC) and Videocon Industries on Tuesday said drilling in a Timor Sea exploration block, where they hold 25 per cent stake each, will begin next year.
Videocon's share of exploratory expenditure would be $18.9 million, a company press release said.
Besides Videocon, GSPC, Bharat Petroleum and Oilex of Australia also have 25 per cent stake each in Block 103 in Joint Petroleum Development Area located in the Timor Sea between Australia and Timor-Leste.
PDA is within the Bonaparte Basin that is estimated to hold 23 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Videocon said a contract for 1,657 sq km of 3-D data acquisition has been awarded at an estimated cost of $18.6 million. About 1,055 sq km of reprocessed 3-D data to the north of the block has already been acquired, it added.
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Timor Leste: a queda da “máscara” Xanana-Horta
Timor Leste: a queda da “máscara” Xanana-Horta
O País
(Semanário Independente)
10.08.07
(Júlio Mendes)
Fui um dos que participou e se entusiasmou sem meias-medidas com a independência daquele país irmão asiático. Era o fim de anos de sofrimento de um povo humilde, perpetrado por países ambiciosos que demonstraram ao longo do tempo uma gritante desorientação na sua política externa. Era a vitória de uma causa que Moçambique acompanhou desde o princípio, através de loobies junto das Nações Unidas e em outros fóruns, no apoio directo aos membros seniores da Fretilin, e nao só.
Quando em 1998 vivemos aquela alegria, a imagem que se tentou transportar para o mundo externo era de que aqueles lideres que sempre lutaram pela independência estavam comprometidos com a causa do povo maubere, e eram os mais indicados para dirigir, com seriedade e comprometimento, o país. Estávamos convictos de que o objectivo comum era a restauração do país. Mas, tal como muitos, enganei-me redondamente. Volvidos poucos anos, o país nao andou. Muito do que transpirou para fora relaciona-se com os conflitos interpessoais dos destacados líderes.
E hoje após aquela palhaçada do ano passado, quando o sistema previamente montado tentou denegrir impiedosamente Mari Alkatiri, imputando-lhe várias culpas que culminaram com constantes manifestações e ondas de desordem por todo o país, sendo a mais grave a de alegadamente ter participado na distribuição de armas aos insurgentes, obrigando-o assim a ceder o cargo de primeiro-ministro, uma posição conquistada democraticamente, eis que a máscara começa a cair em Timor-Leste, com o anúncio do convite formulado por Horta a Xanana para que este último seja primeiro-ministro.
Segundo o pensamento crítico de alguns analistas não comprometidos com o sistema indo-australiano, que parece estar a instrumentalizar alguns políticos timorenses, Xanana Gusmão nunca foi um santinho pelo poder como sempre pretendeu se fazer passar. O mesmo pode-se dizer de Ramos Horta, que após o Prémio Nobel da Paz, partilhado com o grande Madiba, se tentou fazer passar por um democrata puro. No entanto, o derrube estratégico de Mari Alkatiri e o golpe político nas últimas eleições daquele país estão a demonstrar que estamos em presença de dois senhores bastante ambiciosos e com uma agenda que ultrapassa as fronteiras do pequeno espaço timorense.
Numa altura em que a questão de petróleo deveria ocupar os grandes debates daquele país, pelas possibilidades que o “ouro negro” abre para o desenvolvimento e para a erradicação da pobreza, eis que os políticos perdem mais tempo em conflitos pessoais, muitos dos quais consequentes das diferenças de opinião em relação à estratégia a adoptar na política externa, com a amizade com a Austrália à cabeça.
No dia 30 de Junho passado realizaram-se eleições legislativas, nas quais a Fretilin venceu, sem maioria absoluta, com 29.02 % dos votos. Como primeira consequência, Aniceto Guterres, candidato da Fretilin para a presidência da Assembleia Nacional Timorense, perdeu o cargo para Fernando “La Sama” de Araújo, líder do Partido Democrático. Em face dos resultados, e para atingir os seus objectivos, os quatro partidos derrotados nas eleições uniram-se para fazer frente à Fretilin. Até aqui nada a questionar, pois faz parte da estratégia política coligar-se. O que não se compreende muito bem é o papel que a dupla Xanana e Horta tenta desempenhar, quando à partida seriam os mediadores da boa convivência, unidade entre os timorenses, bem como pela responsabilidade e carisma que ambos ostentam. Mas como tinha acontecido aquando da queda de Alkatiri, os dois assumiram-se claramente anti-Fretilin, mas desta feita com objectivos claros, pela forma como instrumentalizaram o processo eleitoral e fizeram desacreditar a Fretilin junto das populações e parte da comunidade internacional.
A partir dai as coisas começaram a ficar difíceis para Mari Alkatiri e companhia. E com o desfecho das eleições, a estratégia de Ramos Horta e Xanana começou a ter pernas. E para que não restassem dúvidas, eis que na última semana chegam notícias segundo as quais Horta convidou Xanana para primeiro-ministro, uma proposta que nunca até então chegou a ser equacionada com muita propriedade. No entanto, para muitos, estava mais do que claro que Xanana nunca se adaptou à posição de presidente, dado que o regime político daquele país confere mais protagonismo e poderes ao primeiro-ministro. Agora, numa clara estratégia em que a igreja católica não está totalmente isenta, Xanana pode a qualquer momento ser confirmado primeiro-ministro, para fazer aquilo que sempre pretendeu. Mesmo que este não ocupe lugar, será alguém da sua inteira confiança e disponível para cumprir as suas ordens, o que não pode acontecer com Alkatiri, que até agora se mostrou íntegro e fiel às suas convicções. Aí é que o mundo vai poder saber, de concreto, a agenda com que a dupla Horta-Xanana se guia.
Por outro lado, com o cenário actual, fica mais evidente que Alkatiri nunca esteve envolvido com a desordem havida ano passado naquele país, pois tudo não passou de uma montagem para o desacreditar como líder político. Em parte foi conseguido, pois o eleitorado ficou bastante dividido, acabando por vencer por forma tímida e “cinzenta” as eleições, muito embora a Fretilin continue a demonstrar força no seio das comunidades.
Com os cenários menos agradáveis que se colocam no país, quem fica a sofrer é o povo, aquele que seria o ponto número um da agenda dos políticos. As ameaças de todas as agremiações políticas, de bloquear o desempenho da Assembleia caso nao fiquem satisfeitos com o desfecho que pretendem, podem ter um impacto que pretendem, mas o grande perdedor é o próprio país, que perde tempo em discutir pessoas ao invés de projectos concretos de combate a pobreza.
.............
Publicada por Malai Azul em 21:52 0 comentários Hiperligações para esta mensagem
Surdos Mundos
Correio da Manhã – 12 de Agosto de 2007
As asas da borboleta
Nuno Rogeiro, Politólogo
[...]
Parte da fresca classe dirigente [em Timor] não aprendeu ainda a arte do compromisso inerente à política ‘normal’.
O Processo
Havendo declaração expressa de apoio de uma coligação ao partido de Xanana, não é inconstitucional a nomeação do ex-presidente como primeiro-ministro, por parte do presidente que já foi primeiro-ministro, Ramos Horta.
Mas Timor não vive um problema jurídico. O que se passa é que uma parte da fresca classe dirigente não aprendeu ainda a arte do compromisso, inerente à política ‘normal’. Para além dos sacrifícios económicos e sociais, deverá haver a renúncia, por partidos e líderes, a 100% de poder.
[...]
Publicada por Malai Azul em 21:49 0 comentários Hiperligações para esta mensagem
Dos Leitores
Margarida deixou um novo comentário na sua mensagem "Dos Leitores":
"Houve luta nas imediações do convento, com armas tradicionais, mas dela só resultaram ferimentos ligeiros", declarou à Antena Um uma porta-voz da polícia da ONU, Kedma Mascarenhas, que não confirmou declarações de um padre salesiano segundo as quais algumas alunas da escola ali existente teriam sido violentadas."
O que me espanta é que 24 horas depois de ter começado esta novela do padre Salesiano de Baucau, o único media português que tentou esclarecer a questão junto da UNPOL em Timor-Leste tenha sido – e muito bem! - a Antena Um, já que a sua iniciativa foi citada tanto pelo jornalista do Público como do DN.
Francamente que não estou a entender a aparente passividade dos nossos media. Acham eles que não se justifica o esclarecimento de tão graves alegações e se sim porquê?
Exorto os senhores jornalistas a darem corda aos sapatos e já que não querem (ou não podem) ir ao terreno ao menos que peguem no telefone e tentem junto de todas as autoridades – nacionais, internacionais – obter informações para se saber se ocorreram ou não ocorreram violações a crianças e mulheres no orfanato de Baucau.
O País
(Semanário Independente)
10.08.07
(Júlio Mendes)
Fui um dos que participou e se entusiasmou sem meias-medidas com a independência daquele país irmão asiático. Era o fim de anos de sofrimento de um povo humilde, perpetrado por países ambiciosos que demonstraram ao longo do tempo uma gritante desorientação na sua política externa. Era a vitória de uma causa que Moçambique acompanhou desde o princípio, através de loobies junto das Nações Unidas e em outros fóruns, no apoio directo aos membros seniores da Fretilin, e nao só.
Quando em 1998 vivemos aquela alegria, a imagem que se tentou transportar para o mundo externo era de que aqueles lideres que sempre lutaram pela independência estavam comprometidos com a causa do povo maubere, e eram os mais indicados para dirigir, com seriedade e comprometimento, o país. Estávamos convictos de que o objectivo comum era a restauração do país. Mas, tal como muitos, enganei-me redondamente. Volvidos poucos anos, o país nao andou. Muito do que transpirou para fora relaciona-se com os conflitos interpessoais dos destacados líderes.
E hoje após aquela palhaçada do ano passado, quando o sistema previamente montado tentou denegrir impiedosamente Mari Alkatiri, imputando-lhe várias culpas que culminaram com constantes manifestações e ondas de desordem por todo o país, sendo a mais grave a de alegadamente ter participado na distribuição de armas aos insurgentes, obrigando-o assim a ceder o cargo de primeiro-ministro, uma posição conquistada democraticamente, eis que a máscara começa a cair em Timor-Leste, com o anúncio do convite formulado por Horta a Xanana para que este último seja primeiro-ministro.
Segundo o pensamento crítico de alguns analistas não comprometidos com o sistema indo-australiano, que parece estar a instrumentalizar alguns políticos timorenses, Xanana Gusmão nunca foi um santinho pelo poder como sempre pretendeu se fazer passar. O mesmo pode-se dizer de Ramos Horta, que após o Prémio Nobel da Paz, partilhado com o grande Madiba, se tentou fazer passar por um democrata puro. No entanto, o derrube estratégico de Mari Alkatiri e o golpe político nas últimas eleições daquele país estão a demonstrar que estamos em presença de dois senhores bastante ambiciosos e com uma agenda que ultrapassa as fronteiras do pequeno espaço timorense.
Numa altura em que a questão de petróleo deveria ocupar os grandes debates daquele país, pelas possibilidades que o “ouro negro” abre para o desenvolvimento e para a erradicação da pobreza, eis que os políticos perdem mais tempo em conflitos pessoais, muitos dos quais consequentes das diferenças de opinião em relação à estratégia a adoptar na política externa, com a amizade com a Austrália à cabeça.
No dia 30 de Junho passado realizaram-se eleições legislativas, nas quais a Fretilin venceu, sem maioria absoluta, com 29.02 % dos votos. Como primeira consequência, Aniceto Guterres, candidato da Fretilin para a presidência da Assembleia Nacional Timorense, perdeu o cargo para Fernando “La Sama” de Araújo, líder do Partido Democrático. Em face dos resultados, e para atingir os seus objectivos, os quatro partidos derrotados nas eleições uniram-se para fazer frente à Fretilin. Até aqui nada a questionar, pois faz parte da estratégia política coligar-se. O que não se compreende muito bem é o papel que a dupla Xanana e Horta tenta desempenhar, quando à partida seriam os mediadores da boa convivência, unidade entre os timorenses, bem como pela responsabilidade e carisma que ambos ostentam. Mas como tinha acontecido aquando da queda de Alkatiri, os dois assumiram-se claramente anti-Fretilin, mas desta feita com objectivos claros, pela forma como instrumentalizaram o processo eleitoral e fizeram desacreditar a Fretilin junto das populações e parte da comunidade internacional.
A partir dai as coisas começaram a ficar difíceis para Mari Alkatiri e companhia. E com o desfecho das eleições, a estratégia de Ramos Horta e Xanana começou a ter pernas. E para que não restassem dúvidas, eis que na última semana chegam notícias segundo as quais Horta convidou Xanana para primeiro-ministro, uma proposta que nunca até então chegou a ser equacionada com muita propriedade. No entanto, para muitos, estava mais do que claro que Xanana nunca se adaptou à posição de presidente, dado que o regime político daquele país confere mais protagonismo e poderes ao primeiro-ministro. Agora, numa clara estratégia em que a igreja católica não está totalmente isenta, Xanana pode a qualquer momento ser confirmado primeiro-ministro, para fazer aquilo que sempre pretendeu. Mesmo que este não ocupe lugar, será alguém da sua inteira confiança e disponível para cumprir as suas ordens, o que não pode acontecer com Alkatiri, que até agora se mostrou íntegro e fiel às suas convicções. Aí é que o mundo vai poder saber, de concreto, a agenda com que a dupla Horta-Xanana se guia.
Por outro lado, com o cenário actual, fica mais evidente que Alkatiri nunca esteve envolvido com a desordem havida ano passado naquele país, pois tudo não passou de uma montagem para o desacreditar como líder político. Em parte foi conseguido, pois o eleitorado ficou bastante dividido, acabando por vencer por forma tímida e “cinzenta” as eleições, muito embora a Fretilin continue a demonstrar força no seio das comunidades.
Com os cenários menos agradáveis que se colocam no país, quem fica a sofrer é o povo, aquele que seria o ponto número um da agenda dos políticos. As ameaças de todas as agremiações políticas, de bloquear o desempenho da Assembleia caso nao fiquem satisfeitos com o desfecho que pretendem, podem ter um impacto que pretendem, mas o grande perdedor é o próprio país, que perde tempo em discutir pessoas ao invés de projectos concretos de combate a pobreza.
.............
Publicada por Malai Azul em 21:52 0 comentários Hiperligações para esta mensagem
Surdos Mundos
Correio da Manhã – 12 de Agosto de 2007
As asas da borboleta
Nuno Rogeiro, Politólogo
[...]
Parte da fresca classe dirigente [em Timor] não aprendeu ainda a arte do compromisso inerente à política ‘normal’.
O Processo
Havendo declaração expressa de apoio de uma coligação ao partido de Xanana, não é inconstitucional a nomeação do ex-presidente como primeiro-ministro, por parte do presidente que já foi primeiro-ministro, Ramos Horta.
Mas Timor não vive um problema jurídico. O que se passa é que uma parte da fresca classe dirigente não aprendeu ainda a arte do compromisso, inerente à política ‘normal’. Para além dos sacrifícios económicos e sociais, deverá haver a renúncia, por partidos e líderes, a 100% de poder.
[...]
Publicada por Malai Azul em 21:49 0 comentários Hiperligações para esta mensagem
Dos Leitores
Margarida deixou um novo comentário na sua mensagem "Dos Leitores":
"Houve luta nas imediações do convento, com armas tradicionais, mas dela só resultaram ferimentos ligeiros", declarou à Antena Um uma porta-voz da polícia da ONU, Kedma Mascarenhas, que não confirmou declarações de um padre salesiano segundo as quais algumas alunas da escola ali existente teriam sido violentadas."
O que me espanta é que 24 horas depois de ter começado esta novela do padre Salesiano de Baucau, o único media português que tentou esclarecer a questão junto da UNPOL em Timor-Leste tenha sido – e muito bem! - a Antena Um, já que a sua iniciativa foi citada tanto pelo jornalista do Público como do DN.
Francamente que não estou a entender a aparente passividade dos nossos media. Acham eles que não se justifica o esclarecimento de tão graves alegações e se sim porquê?
Exorto os senhores jornalistas a darem corda aos sapatos e já que não querem (ou não podem) ir ao terreno ao menos que peguem no telefone e tentem junto de todas as autoridades – nacionais, internacionais – obter informações para se saber se ocorreram ou não ocorreram violações a crianças e mulheres no orfanato de Baucau.
Saturday, August 11, 2007
Armed attack on UN police in East Timor
An armed ambush on a UN police vehicle in East Timor has raised fears opposition Fretilin supporters may be preparing armed resistance to the newly installed government of Xanana Gusmao.
Donna Cusumano, UN spokesperson in Baucau, said the vehicle was travelling in convoy to escort a civilian car between Baucau and Viqueque when the attack occurred on Friday.
"The car stopped to move a log which had been put across the road," Cusumano said. "It was carrying a Pakistani, Chinese and two Sri Lankan officers. They said 'many, many shots' were fired at them."
The UN's Dili office said mission head Atul Khare had pledged that those involved would be caught and tried.
A scheduled helicopter visit to Baucau on Saturday by President Jose Ramos-Horta and Khare had been called off.
It was the first armed attack on a UN vehicle in East Timor since peacekeepers clashed with Indonesian-backed militia groups in 1999.
Baucau man Marito Reis, who has been appointed state secretary for Veterans' Affairs in the new government, said the cars were attacked by a hostile crowd of around 600 rock-throwing Fretilin demonstrators hidden on hills either side of the road, during which volleys of rifle fire were also directed at them.
He said the demonstrators have been gearing up for days for the new president's visit.
He said a Timorese policeman at the scene told him the tyres of the vehicles were shot out and that the UN police officers travelling in it returned fire.
"The attackers apparently used automatic assault rifles," he said.
The UN officers radioed Timorese police to assist, and the Timorese army also came to their aid.
Both a UN and Timorese police vehicle were subsequently burnt by the attackers. There were no injuries on the UN side, but Reis said one of the attackers was thought to have been hit by a police bullet.
The Fretilin party scored the most votes in recent parliamentary elections, but failed to gain a working majority.
Ramos-Horta then nominated an alliance of several parties led by Gusmao's CNRT party to form a government instead.
Fretilin has pledged to boycott it and last week began mobilising supporters in the east, where it is strongest.
"Fretilin called three days of demonstrations here during which houses and government buildings have been burnt," Reis said, "but some of their people went to the mountains to dig up arms caches."
The spectre of armed revolt in East Timor has focused previously on anti-Fretilin westerners led by Major Alfredo Reinado; it is now feared others may take to the mountains to destabilise the fledgling democracy further.
© 2007 AAP
Donna Cusumano, UN spokesperson in Baucau, said the vehicle was travelling in convoy to escort a civilian car between Baucau and Viqueque when the attack occurred on Friday.
"The car stopped to move a log which had been put across the road," Cusumano said. "It was carrying a Pakistani, Chinese and two Sri Lankan officers. They said 'many, many shots' were fired at them."
The UN's Dili office said mission head Atul Khare had pledged that those involved would be caught and tried.
A scheduled helicopter visit to Baucau on Saturday by President Jose Ramos-Horta and Khare had been called off.
It was the first armed attack on a UN vehicle in East Timor since peacekeepers clashed with Indonesian-backed militia groups in 1999.
Baucau man Marito Reis, who has been appointed state secretary for Veterans' Affairs in the new government, said the cars were attacked by a hostile crowd of around 600 rock-throwing Fretilin demonstrators hidden on hills either side of the road, during which volleys of rifle fire were also directed at them.
He said the demonstrators have been gearing up for days for the new president's visit.
He said a Timorese policeman at the scene told him the tyres of the vehicles were shot out and that the UN police officers travelling in it returned fire.
"The attackers apparently used automatic assault rifles," he said.
The UN officers radioed Timorese police to assist, and the Timorese army also came to their aid.
Both a UN and Timorese police vehicle were subsequently burnt by the attackers. There were no injuries on the UN side, but Reis said one of the attackers was thought to have been hit by a police bullet.
The Fretilin party scored the most votes in recent parliamentary elections, but failed to gain a working majority.
Ramos-Horta then nominated an alliance of several parties led by Gusmao's CNRT party to form a government instead.
Fretilin has pledged to boycott it and last week began mobilising supporters in the east, where it is strongest.
"Fretilin called three days of demonstrations here during which houses and government buildings have been burnt," Reis said, "but some of their people went to the mountains to dig up arms caches."
The spectre of armed revolt in East Timor has focused previously on anti-Fretilin westerners led by Major Alfredo Reinado; it is now feared others may take to the mountains to destabilise the fledgling democracy further.
© 2007 AAP
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